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  • Free Speech, Criminal Thresholds, and Judicial Control

    With increasing instances of criminal proceedings arising out of social media expression, the boundary between protected speech and penal liability has become both contested and consequential. The question is no longer abstract, it is doctrinal, where exactly does the law draw the line between expression and offence. The Supreme Court’s decision in Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat (2025) engaged directly with this question. At its core, the case tests whether criminal law can be invoked against poetic expression without satisfying the essential elements embedded in both the Constitution and penal statutes.

    The prosecution arose from a video posted on social media containing a poem, which was alleged to promote communal disharmony, affect national unity, and hurt religious sentiments. The High Court declined to interfere at the threshold, relying primarily on the pendency of investigation. The Supreme Court was therefore required to determine whether, even on a plain reading of the material, the statutory ingredients of the alleged offences were disclosed.

    The Court’s analysis is firmly anchored in the constitutional structure of Article 19. While Article 19(1)(a) guarantees freedom of speech and expression, restrictions under Article 19(2) operate as narrowly tailored exceptions. This structural hierarchy informs the interpretation of all speech-related offences, which cannot be applied in a manner that dilutes the primacy of the right itself.

    Against this backdrop, the Court examined the relevant provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, particularly Sections 196, 197, and 299. A consistent doctrinal thread runs through these provisions, criminal liability arises only where speech is directed against identifiable groups on protected grounds, carries a real tendency to create enmity or disturb public order, and is accompanied by the requisite intention. Mere offensiveness, dissent, or strong expression does not satisfy this threshold.

    Applying this framework, the Court undertook a contextual reading of the poem and found no reference to any religion, caste, or community, no incitement to violence, and no material indicating an intention to promote disharmony. The expression, read as a whole, conveyed resistance to injustice through non-violence. On this basis, the Court held that none of the alleged offences were attracted.

    In doing so, the Court reaffirmed two critical interpretive safeguards. First, speech must be evaluated from the standpoint of a reasonable, firm-minded individual, not through the lens of hypersensitivity or subjective offence. Second, mens rea remains indispensable in speech offences, intention cannot be presumed from isolated or strained readings of the content.

    The judgment also carries important procedural implications. Interpreting Section 173(3) of the BNSS, the Court emphasised that in offences punishable up to seven years, particularly those involving speech, the police are empowered to conduct a preliminary inquiry to determine whether a prima facie case exists. This mechanism is not merely procedural, it serves as a constitutional safeguard against the mechanical invocation of criminal law in matters of expression.

    Equally significant is the Court’s rejection of the view that the stage of investigation limits judicial intervention. Where the basic ingredients of an offence are absent on the face of the record, the continuation of proceedings itself constitutes an abuse of process. In such cases, the High Court is not only empowered, but obligated, to intervene at the threshold.

    The decision thus restores doctrinal clarity in an area increasingly susceptible to overreach. By insisting on strict adherence to statutory ingredients, contextual interpretation, and the centrality of intent, the Court repositions criminal law within its legitimate domain, the regulation of harm, not the policing of disagreement.

    At a broader level, the judgment underscored a constitutional caution. If speech offences are allowed to operate on subjective perceptions of offence or speculative harm, the exception under Article 19(2) risks subsuming the guarantee under Article 19(1)(a). The discipline imposed by this decision lies precisely in preventing that inversion.

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  • Delhi HC on Injunctions When Patent Granted Is Near Expiry [Pharma Litigation]

    In Pharma patent disputes the closer a patent moves towards expiry, the more pressing becomes the question whether injunctive relief continues to serve any meaningful legal purpose.

    The issue before the Delhi High Court Division Bench was whether refusal of interim injunction in a patent infringement action warranted appellate interference, where a validity challenge had been raised and the patent was nearing expiry.

    Essential Facts

    The appellant asserted infringement of its patent covering Semaglutide. The respondents did not seriously contest acts amounting to infringement, but resisted relief by invoking invalidity under Section 64.

    The learned Single Judge found a credible challenge to validity and declined injunction. By the time of appeal, the patent had approximately two months of life remaining.

    The governing principles are settled:

    •defendant may rely on any ground under Section 64 as a defence under Section 107

    •At the interim stage, a credible challenge suffices

    •Appellate review of such orders is limited by the Wander standard, permitting interference only where discretion is exercised perversely or contrary to law.

    The analysis engages:

    • Section 48, conferring exclusive rights
    • Section 64(1)(a), (e), (f), governing revocation
    • Section 107(1), incorporating these grounds as defences

    The Court underscores a critical distinction, Section 64(1)(a) requires strict claim identity, whereas Sections 64(1)(e) and (f) operate through broader concepts of anticipation and obviousness.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court declines interference on two interlinked grounds.

    First, applying the Wander principle, it finds no error in the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge.

    Second, it affirms that a credible challenge to validity exists under Section 64(1)(f). The prior art disclosed the structural framework from which the claimed invention could be derived through a substitution already contemplated within its teaching. This, in the Court’s view, rendered the invention prima facie obvious to a person skilled in the art, or more appropriately, a “person in the know”.

    Crucially, the Court introduces an additional consideration. With the patent on the verge of expiry, the grant of injunction would yield no substantive or enduring benefit, thereby undermining the claim of irreparable harm.

    The judgment performs two important clarificatory functions.

    It restores doctrinal precision by separating anticipation by prior claiming from obviousness, rejecting any attempt to collapse the former into an enabling disclosure analysis.

    More significantly, it recalibrates the application of interim relief principles. While not altering the established triad governing injunctions, the Court integrates proximity to patent expiry into the assessment of irreparable injury and balance of convenience. This marks a shift from purely rights-based enforcement towards a more context-sensitive exercise of discretion.

    The decision leaves open questions as to the extent to which proximity to expiry should systematically influence interim relief. It does not delineate whether such reasoning is confined to exceptional cases or capable of broader application.

    Further, the relationship between residual patent value and equitable protection remains unexplored, particularly in high-value pharmaceutical markets.

    The immediate consequence is a heightened threshold for obtaining interim injunctions in late-stage patent life. Patent holders may find exclusivity increasingly difficult to enforce as expiry approaches, especially where defendants can articulate a plausible invalidity challenge.

    For defendants, the decision reinforces the strategic value of raising credible, even if not conclusive, validity objections at the interlocutory stage.

    The judgment does not dilute patent rights, but places their interim enforcement within a framework that accounts for timing, utility, and judicial economy.

    In doing so, it affirms that interlocutory relief in patent law is not merely a function of entitlement, but of contextual justification.

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  • Dominant Feature and Phonetic Similarity in Composite Trade Marks

    The dispute in Asian Paints Limited v. Tarun Paints Private Limited  [Delhi High Court Judgment (2026)] arose from allegations by Asian Paints Limited that the mark “ASIA TUFF,” used by Tarun Paints Private Limited, infringed its registered trademark “ASIAN PAINTS.” The plaintiff contended that the word “ASIAN” constituted the dominant and distinctive element of its composite mark and that the defendant’s adoption of the word “ASIA” represented a deliberate approximation designed to capitalise on the goodwill attached to the plaintiff’s brand.

    The case required the court to apply the settled test of deceptive similarity, namely whether an average consumer with imperfect recollection would likely be misled by the defendant’s mark. While composite marks must generally be evaluated in their entirety, the court reiterated that particular emphasis may be placed on the dominant or essential feature of a mark, especially where other components are descriptive in nature.

    Within this framework, the phonetic and visual proximity between the words “ASIAN” and “ASIA” became central to the dispute. Given that both parties operated in relation to identical goods, namely paints and allied products, the court examined whether the similarity in the principal element of the marks could create a likelihood of confusion or association in the marketplace.

    The judgment thus reinforces a familiar strand of Indian trademark jurisprudence: the assessment of similarity is ultimately contextual and consumer-centric. Even relatively small variations in wording may assume significance where the dominant feature of a well-known mark is reproduced in a competing mark used for the same class of goods

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  • Calcutta High Court On Whether The Patent Office Can Merge Examination and Pre-Grant Opposition? And How This Impacts Future Pre Grant Oppositions

    The judgment in UPL vs Haryana Pesticides (2026), decided on 5 February 2026 by the Calcutta High Court’s Intellectual Property Rights Division, examines a crucial procedural question under the Patents Act, 1970 arising from the rejection of UPL’s patent application for “Herbicidal Combinations” following a pre-grant opposition. The Court set aside the rejection order on grounds of procedural impropriety and violation of natural justice, and remanded the matter for fresh consideration. This judgment reinforces the structural separation between patent examination and pre-grant opposition proceedings, clarifies that a requested Section 14 hearing cannot be bypassed for administrative convenience, and firmly reiterates that reasoned, independent decision-making is foundational to patent adjudication in India.

    The central issue was whether the Controller of Patents could dispose of examination proceedings under Sections 14 and 15 and pre-grant opposition proceedings under Section 25(1) of the Patents Act through a single composite order, without granting separate hearings. The Court had to determine whether such a procedure violated the statutory scheme of the Act and the principles of natural justice.

    The judgment clearly demarcates the distinction between examination proceedings and pre-grant opposition proceedings. It reinforces that procedural safeguards under the Patents Act are mandatory and clarifies the limited role of a pre-grant opponent in patent examination. It strengthens the requirement that quasi-judicial patent decisions must be reasoned and speaking orders and it serves as an important precedent for patent prosecution and opposition practice in India.

    Facts:

    UPL Limited filed a patent application on 26 March 2018 titled “Herbicidal Combinations”. The application was published on 27 September 2019 and First Examination Report was issued on 24 January 2020. Thereafter UPL filed its response to the FER on 22 July 2020 and specifically requested a hearing under Section 14.

    Respondent No. 1 filed a pre-grant opposition under Section 25(1) on 30 September 2020. Additional prior art documents D3 to D5 were introduced in the opposition, which were not part of the FER. A hearing on the pre-grant opposition and a single composite order dated 27 April 2023 rejected the patent application on grounds of lack of novelty, lack of inventive step, and Section 3(e) being a mere admixture.

    UPL challenged this rejection before the Calcutta High Court and the issues Before the Court included:

    Whether examination proceedings under Sections 14–15 and pre-grant opposition proceedings under Section 25(1) are distinct statutory stages.

    Whether the Controller was required to grant separate hearings under Section 14 and Section 25(1).

    Whether passing a composite order violated the scheme of the Patents Act.

    Whether failure to supply prior art D4 and consideration of new prior arts without adequate opportunity violated natural justice.

    Whether the impugned order was a valid speaking order with independent reasoning.

    Whether a pre-grant opponent has a right to participate in examination proceedings.

    The Decision:

    The Court held that Sections 14–15 (examination stage) and Section 25(1) (pre-grant opposition stage) are distinct and independent proceedings under the Patents Act, 1970. The statutory scheme does not contemplate merger of these processes

    Since the appellant had expressly requested a hearing under Section 14, the Controller was obligated to grant it. Failure to do so and passing a combined order constituted procedural impropriety. The Court relied upon S.N. Mukherjee vs Union of India, where the Supreme Court held that recording reasons is an essential facet of natural justice in quasi-judicial decisions.The High Court found that the Controller’s order lacked independent reasoning and mechanically adopted the opponent’s submissions. The Court relied heavily on Novartis AG vs Natco Pharma Limited, which clarified that the examination process is an independent statutory duty of the Controller. A pre-grant opponent has a right of hearing only in opposition proceedings. The opponent cannot claim participatory rights in the examination process. The two processes must remain structurally distinct. The Court also referred to Gilead Pharmasset, LLC vs Union of India & Anr., which emphasised that procedural violations affecting natural justice justify setting aside patent decisions.

    The Court concluded that the composite order failed to demarcate findings under Sections 15 and 25(1). The applicant was prejudiced by consideration of additional prior art without separate hearing. The matter required fresh adjudication. The appeal was allowed and the impugned order dated 27 April 2023 was set aside. The matter was remanded to a different Controller. Fresh hearing under proper statutory procedure was directed. The Court did not decide patentability on merits.

    Impact on other pending pre-grant oppositions includes: 

    Mandatory Hearing Separation: The ruling establishes that if a patent applicant expressly requests a Section 14 hearing(examination stage), the Controller cannot bypass it by only holding a combined pre-grant opposition hearing. Pending cases where such a request was made but ignored are now highly vulnerable to being set aside on appeal.

    Identifiable Findings: Even if a “common order” is passed for administrative ease, it must now clearly demarcate which portions relate to Section 15 (rejection by the Office) and which relate to Section 25(1) (opposition by a third party). Orders that conflate these findings can be challenged as lacking independent reasoning.

    Introduction of New Prior Art: The court highlighted that introducing new prior art during the opposition stage requires a fair rebuttal opportunity for the applicant. Pending oppositions where new evidence was introduced without a chance for the applicant to amend claims or provide separate data are likely to be remanded for fresh consideration.

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  • Supreme Court On Fixing Minimum Wages Of Domestic Workers

    Does the Constitution guarantee  minimum wages to domestic workers? The Supreme Court answered this in 2026. In Thozhilalargal Sangam & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [W.P.(C) No. 42/2026], case filed with the aim that Domestic workers should be covered  under minimum wage laws. That minimum wages should be declared a fundamental right, directions be issued to Centre and States to fix wages and grant protection under labour laws

    On 29 January 2026, a Bench comprising Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi ruled that implementing minimum wages is a legislative and executive matter best left to State authorities.

    The Apex court while observing that domestic workers are vulnerable reasoned that wage fixation is a legislative function and courts cannot force law-making, while the policy decisions lie with Parliament and States

    The Court expressed concern that mandatory wage fixation for households could lead to trade unions dragging “every household” into litigation, potentially discouraging people from hiring domestic help

    Supreme Court refused to fix minimum wages, did not declare it a fundamental right and the petition disposed of

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  • Supreme Court On Whether Insolvency Tribunals Can Decide Trademark Ownership Disputes

    A recent Supreme Court judgment dated 22nd January 2026, involving the trademark “GLOSTER” has brought crucial clarity on whether insolvency tribunals can decide trademark ownership disputes. The ruling draws a clear boundary between insolvency resolution under the IBC and independent civil rights under trademark law, making it an important decision for businesses, insolvency professionals, and IP practitioners alike.

    The dispute arose from the long and complex relationship between Fort Gloster Industries Limited (FGIL) and Gloster Cables Limited (GCL). FGIL was the original registered owner of the trademark “GLOSTER”. Over time, FGIL allowed GCL to use the trademark under collaboration and licensing agreements. FGIL eventually stopped its manufacturing operations and later became financially distressed, leading to proceedings before the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction. During this period, FGIL entered into multiple arrangements with GCL, including exclusive licensing, creation of charge over the trademark as security for a loan, and a future-oriented agreement contemplating assignment of the trademark once statutory restrictions were lifted.

    After the BIFR regime ended, FGIL executed a deed assigning the trademark to GCL, and GCL was subsequently recorded as the registered proprietor in the Trademark Registry. Around the same time, insolvency proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code were initiated against FGIL. A resolution plan submitted by Gloster Limited was approved by the Committee of Creditors. However, the plan acknowledged that ownership of the trademark “GLOSTER” was disputed and subject to existing agreements in favour of GCL.

    The conflict intensified when GCL approached the NCLT seeking exclusion of the trademark from the resolution plan, asserting that the trademark no longer belonged to FGIL. The NCLT rejected this claim and went further to declare that the trademark was an asset of FGIL, thereby vesting it in the Successful Resolution Applicant. This declaration was overturned by the NCLAT, which held that the insolvency tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction. The matter ultimately reached the Supreme Court through cross appeals.

    The Supreme Court ruled that the NCLT had no authority to conclusively decide trademark ownership under Section 60(5) of the IBC. The Court emphasised that insolvency tribunals are meant to resolve issues arising directly from insolvency, not to adjudicate complex civil disputes involving title, contractual interpretation, and intellectual property rights. Trademark ownership, the Court held, is a substantive civil right that exists independently of insolvency proceedings.

    A key part of the Court’s reasoning was that the approved resolution plan itself did not clearly vest ownership of the trademark in FGIL or the Resolution Applicant. Instead, it recorded competing claims and merely expressed a belief that agreements in favour of GCL were invalid. The Court clarified that such beliefs cannot be converted into declarations of ownership by the NCLT. Once a resolution plan is approved by creditors, the adjudicating authority cannot rewrite or improve it by granting additional substantive rights.

    The Court also noted that if the assignment of the trademark was alleged to be illegal, preferential, or undervalued, the Insolvency Code provides specific mechanisms for avoidance proceedings. No such proceedings were initiated by the Resolution Professional. In the absence of these statutory actions, the NCLT could not invalidate the assignment or decide title by default.

    The Supreme Court clarified that the judgment made it clear that trademark ownership disputes must be decided by competent civil or commercial courts, or through statutory remedies available under the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Insolvency tribunals cannot be used as shortcuts to settle long-standing intellectual property disputes.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s ruling draws a firm jurisdictional line between insolvency law and intellectual property rights. While insolvency proceedings can determine how assets of a corporate debtor are resolved, they cannot be used to decide disputed ownership of trademarks or other independent civil rights.

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  • Copyright Versus Moral Rights Versus Performers Right

    A creator must know these concepts to protect their rights. So I’m going to breakdown the concept of what is copyright moral right what is performers right under the Indian Copyright Act 1957 with examples for your better understanding.

    Copyright

    Let’s begin with the concept of copyright and the concerning main sections are section 13 and 14 under the Indian Copyright Act.

    What is the concept of copyright? In simple words it means legal ownership over your original creative work which in most cases will last for the lifetime of the creator plus further specified years depending on the category of work. Various works are put under different categories such as literary category, dramatic, musical, artistic, cinematograph film, sound recording.

    For example, architectural drawing come under artistic category. Software program are special category and come under literary category.

    Rights Conferred By Copyright

    Copyright gives the creator of an original work exclusive rights in relation to the work and prohibit others from infringing such rights. Copyright holder has sole legal authority to reproduce the work, to publish or distribute it, to sell or license to monetise and adapt or remix the work, and to perform it in public.

    In relation to copyright, please note that the moment you create your original work, you already hold a copyright over it, there is no mandatory requirement under law to register your copyright. But the moment any kind of dispute arises and you need to prove your right, that is when registration comes to your aid, registration makes copyright legally enforceable in disputes and it goes in your favour. It is always advisable to be careful and get your work registered.

    Moral Rights

    Moving on to the next concept that is moral rights, what is the section of copyright act dealing with this right? It is section 57 which specifies moral rights. So. Let’s understand what moral rights mean?

    Even if you assign your copyright or license it, or copyright time period expires, section 57 gives you rights known as moral rights which can never be taken away. Moral rights come under two categories, they are “right of paternity” and “right off integrity”.

    Right of Paternity

    It means to be credited as the original creator. For example, if you are a singer or a writer of a novel, you will always be identified as their creator or author even when the copyright is over or copyright is assigned to someone else. This is your basic right of paternity you will always be associated as the author of that work.

    Right of Integrity

    It means you have the right even after assigning your copyright to stop someone from distorting your work or modifying your work or misusing your work that can harm your reputation. For example, being an author of a novel you have assigned your rights for it to be made into a motion picture, you still have the right to stop the distortion of your work which will harm your reputation as the creator of that work.

    After the concept of copyright and moral rights let’s move on to the next concept that is performer rights.

    Performers Rights

    Relevant sections? Section 38, 38 A, and 38 B of the Copyright Act.

    If you perform live, such as sing or dance or act or other live performances, you are protected under these section of the Indian Copyright Act. For example, you are giving live musical performance and someone records your live performance and uploads it, you can claim ownership , demand payment, and get it blocked.

    Hence, unauthorised recording and uploading and streaming without your permission or using your live performances commercially without paying you, these are prohibited and you have rights as a performer to take legal recourse against such accents.

    Hence, Copyright Act can be said to be equivalent to ownership and monetisation rights. Moral rights give you credit as well as respect for your work, Performer rights give you control over usage of your life performance.

    So, be aware of your rights and protect your art, protect your name, and protect your future.

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  • How India Plans to Regulate AI Training Data with a Unified Royalty Framework

    As countries grapple with how to regulate the fast-expanding world of artificial intelligence, a global debate has emerged on the ethical, economic, and legal implications of using copyrighted material for AI training. From the United States to the European Union, policymakers, creators, and technology companies are engaged in ongoing discussions about how to balance innovation with the rights of authors and artists.

    This international conversation forms an important backdrop for India’s own policy shift, providing context for the country’s attempt to craft a structured, fair, and forward-looking approach. It is against this evolving global landscape that India proposes a new AI royalty framework for OpenAI, Google, and other developers by introducing an important policy proposal aimed at creating a fair and transparent system for the use of copyrighted Indian content in AI training.India proposes new AI royalty framework for OpenAI, Google, and other developers by introducing an important policy proposal aimed at creating a fair and transparent system for the use of copyrighted Indian content in AI training.

    The Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT) has released a working paper that proposes a new “One Nation, One Licence, One Payment” mandatory royalty framework for AI companies using copyrighted content for training. A government-appointed expert panel has recommended that companies such as OpenAI and Google should pay royalties when their AI models are trained using books, articles, music, films, photographs, and other protected works.

    Unlicensed use of copyrighted material for training AI systems raises genuine concerns under copyright law. A blanket statutory exception allowing AI developers to freely use such material without the creators consent would tilt the balance too far in favour of AI companies, eventually discouraging the creation of new human generated works. AI itself cannot thrive without fresh human creativity, since relying on the same old datasets would limit its growth. Therefore, to support cultural progress, maintain incentives for human creators, and enable the development of effective AI systems, a balanced legal approach is necessary.

    The most suitable solution is a framework that guarantees fair compensation to copyright holders while still allowing AI developers broad and practical access to training data. The proposal is built around a “One Nation, One Licence, One Payment” approach. Instead of requiring separate agreements with each creator, AI companies would contribute to a central licensing fund. This fund would then distribute royalties to authors, artists, journalists, and other rights-holders whose content supports the development of AI systems.India’s model is distinctive globally. In the United States, AI training on publicly available material is often treated as fair use, meaning no royalty obligations.

    In the European Union, creators can opt out, but payments are not compulsory. India’s framework focuses on ensuring fair compensation in a structured and predictable manner.Creative communities have welcomed the proposal as a step toward protecting their work in the AI era, while some technology groups are evaluating its potential impact on innovation. The government has opened the proposal for public comments before finalizing the policy.

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  • Moral Rights, Performers’ Rights and Copyright: Creative Ownership in Indian Music

    Every work of art has three aspects tying it to its creator , the “right to own it”, the “right to be recognised for it”, and the “right to perform it”. In law, these are called “copyright”, “moral rights”, and “performer’s rights” respectively. Together they governs how creative works are owned, shared, and remembered.

    Copyright law is designed to protect originality, to ensure that the person who creates a melody, writes a poem, or paints a canvas can control its use. For example, when a musician composes an original score for a film, or when a painter paints a canvas, their creations are protected as copyright works.

    Under the Copyright Act, 1957, this protection lasts for 60 years after the author’s death, allowing the creator (or their heirs) to control how the work is used, licensed, or reproduced.

    Moral rights, on the other hand, evolved to preserve the bond of honour between an author and their work, even when they no longer own the economic rights.
    For instance, a painter after selling the painting or a singer in Indian movie album, , still retained the right to be recognised as its creator and to object if the art-work was distorted or defaced.
    These rights, defined under Section 57, also last for the author’s lifetime plus 60 years, ensuring that reputation outlives ownership.

    Performer’s rights came later, acknowledging that an artist’s live expression, the voice that brings a song to life, also deserves protection. When Lata Mangeshkar sang a composition, or a classical dancer performs a piece, their performance itself becomes a creative act.

    Under Sections 38 to 38B, performers enjoy rights over their recorded performances for 50 years from the year of performance, including the right to be identified and to prevent unauthorised recordings or distortions.

    Indian Classical Rendition-Copyright And Performer’s Rights

    Each of the discussed three rights spring from the same root, yet their boundaries often blur. When we look at the Indian classical reditions, the question arises that what happens when art is not created in isolation but drawn from centuries of tradition? Can an artist claim copyright over a raga, a chant, or a hymn that has travelled through generations? Does originality lie in the composition, or in the performance that reinterprets it?

    The case before Delhi High Court involving dispute between A.R. Rahman and  Faiyaz Wasifuddin Daga, questioned who truly owns music born from heritage.
    The controversy centred around the celebrated song “Veera Raja Veera” from Ponniyin Selvan II, composed by Rahman, and an old Dhrupad piece “Shiva Stuti,” performed decades earlier by the legendary Junior Dagar brothers. The Dagar family claimed that Rahman’s composition reproduced their work almost note for note.

    Initially, the Delhi High Court agreed and directed Rahman and his producers to deposit ₹2 crore and credit the Dagars in the film. But the Division Bench later reversed this, holding that while the Dagars had performed the piece, they had not proved they “composed” it.

    That distinction lies at the heart of copyright.

    Under the “Copyright Act, 1957”, the “author” of a musical work , the composer , owns the right to reproduce and adapt it. If the work is part of an ancient or traditional repertoire, it belongs to the “public domain”. The court found that “Shiva Stuti” was a Dhrupad chant handed down through generations, not a private creation. Hence, no exclusive copyright could exist. Rahman’s composition, even if inspired by the same tradition, was therefore legally independent.

    This ruling brought to light a subtle but crucial truth about creativity, that authorship and performance, though intertwined, are not the same. The law draws a fine line between creating a work and expressing it. While copyright guards the composer’s structure of notes, rhythm, and arrangement, it does not extend to the individuality of a performance that brings those notes to life. It is in this space between authorship and interpretation  that performers’ rights find their voice.

    Performers’ rights, introduced in “1994” and strengthened in “2012”, protect a different kind of creativity, the “interpretation”. When a singer, dancer, or instrumentalist performs a work, they invest originality in tone, rhythm, and emotion. Sections 38 to 38B grant them rights to be identified as the performer, to prevent distortion of their recorded performance, and in some cases, to share royalties. But these rights do not make them the authors of the composition itself. The Dagar family’s claim, was caught in this distinction, they were heirs to great performers, not proven composers.

    Running parallel to both Copyright and Performer’s rights is the doctrine of “moral rights” under “Section 57” , a uniquely personal safeguard that survives even after copyright transfer. Moral rights protect an author’s connection to their work through two principles, the right of “paternity” (to be credited) and the right of “integrity” (to prevent distortion). It was this moral impulse that led the single judge in the Rahman dispute to order that the Junior Dagar brothers be credited in the film.

    Later when the appellate court examined the issue, it held that moral rights arise only if authorship is first established. Without proof of who composed “Shiva Stuti”, the claim to moral authorship could not stand.

    Each right operates within its own register. “Copyright” secures authorship and commercial control. “Performers’ rights” celebrate expression and performance. “Moral rights” preserve honour and attribution. In a country like India , where art often flows through oral traditions and collective memory, identifying authorship can be legally complex and emotionally charged. Folk songs, classical ragas, and devotional hymns belong to everyone and to no one at once, leaving courts to walk a fine line between preserving heritage and rewarding innovation.

    For today’s creators, the lesson is clear. Document authorship with precision , notations, recordings, and dated drafts establish originality better than memory. Acknowledge influences, even if the law does not compel it, cultural respect often prevents legal conflict. When collaborating, define who is the composer, lyricist, and performer and most importantly copyright registration is the demand  of the changing times.

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  • Centre Offers Article 371 to Ladakh: What It Means for Statehood and Sixth Schedule Demands

    As per new reports, in recent talks, the central government has indicated that it could consider extending Article 371 special provisions to Ladakh, as a possible way to address the demands. The Ladakhi groups (LAB, KDA) continue to demand statehood plus Sixth Schedule status. Here’s a breakdown of what’s going on and what the offer from the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) means

    On 31st October 2019, the former state of Jammu & Kashmir was reorganised under the Jammu & Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019 into two Union Territories (UTs), one being Ladakh. Unlike some UTs, Ladakh does not have its own legislative assembly. It is directly administered by a Lieutenant Governor and central government.

    Local groups in Ladakh, notably the Leh Apex Body (LAB) and the Kargil Democratic Alliance (KDA), have demanded statehood for Ladakh (i.e., become a state, with its own legislature) and inclusion under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution of India (which provides for special autonomous district/tribal councils) to protect land, jobs, culture and resources.

    The major unrest on 24 September 2025 due to protests in Leh led to four people being killed in clashes with police. This escalated urgency for talks. Following that, the central government resumed talks with Ladakhi groups after a break, to discuss constitutional safeguards.

    What is Article  371 of the Constitution of India?

    Article 371 of the Indian Constitution contains special provisions for several states to address their unique developmental, cultural and security concerns. This Article allows for “asymmetric federalism,” where not all states are treated equally, and special arrangements are made to accommodate their specific needs within the broader framework of the Indian Union. While Article 371 was part of the original Constitution for Maharashtra and Gujarat, other states were added through subsequent amendments, with provisions ranging from Article 371A to 371J

    Article 371 has provided “temporary, transitional and special arrangements” for specific states in India (mostly in the north-east) to protect local interests such as land, culture and jobs. It gives powers such as, local legislation for specified areas, additional protection for customary laws, control over land-ownership or transfer etc in some states. It is less extensive than the Sixth Schedule autonomy. Sixth Schedule provides for democratic bodies (Autonomous District Councils) with legislative, judicial and executive powers in tribal areas.

    Article 371 could address various Ladakhi concerns such as protection of land and resources from outside settlement/investment, given strategic, ecological and cultural sensitivity of the region, priority for locals in jobs, who gets domicile status, who can apply for jobs, local governance and decision-making etc

    Offering Article 371 may be seen as bringing constitutional guarantee of better protection. If granted, possible implications include, Ladakh getting legal protection for land, jobs, maybe stronger local councils, maybe legislative powers for certain areas. That would strengthen safeguards for locals. It will not make Ladakh a State (it would remain UT). For the central government this might be a way to defuse unrest in Ladakh by offering something substantive, without committing to full statehood which could mean many logistical, political, strategic implications.

    As talks between the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and Ladakhi leaders continue, the future of Ladakh hangs in the balance. Extending Article 371 could bring long-awaited constitutional protections and help calm tensions in the region, the outcome will shape not only Ladakh’s governance but also India’s broader approach to balancing national control with regional aspirations.

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