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  • Beware of The Risks Matrimonial Websites Pose & The Law Which Protects Such Websites shaadi[dot]com case

    The illusion of “safe” matchmaking is dangerous indeed, in an era where technology claims to bridge hearts, India’s online matrimonial platforms have transformed the search for life partners into a digital transaction. With glossy interfaces and promises of “verified profiles,” these portals appear as safe havens for those seeking companionship. But behind this comforting illusion lies a perilous reality, stories of fraud, blackmail, extortion, and emotional abuse have become disturbingly common. Individuals, often genuinely searching for love and trust, fall prey to predators hiding behind curated online profiles.What makes this digital danger even more troubling is that these platforms are legally insulated from responsibility. Under India’s Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act), they are classified as “intermediaries”, mere facilitators of user interaction and hence cannot be held liable for the criminal acts, obscenity, or exploitation committed by users on their platforms. This immunity, called the “safe harbour” protection under Section 79 of the IT Act, means that while victims suffer real harm, the platforms that host these interactions walk free of legal accountability.

    In Anupam Mittal v. State of U.P. and Others (Allahabad High Court, 26 September 2025), bench comprising Justice Siddhartha Varma and Justice Madan Pal Singh had to decide on this uneasy truth. The Court quashed criminal proceedings against shaadi.com founder Anupam Mittal, reaffirming that platforms like his cannot be prosecuted for the misdeeds of their users. The ruling highlights the yawning gap between user vulnerability and platform immunity, a gap that continues to grow as human relationships migrate online.

    Core issue was can platform owners be criminally liable for user misconduct? The Court had to decide whether the CEO of an online matchmaking platform could be held criminally responsible for offences like obscenity, extortion, or cheating allegedly committed by users on that platform. The petitioner, Anupam Mittal, argued that shaadi[dot]com merely provides the digital infrastructure for users to connect and that he, as the platform’s head, had no control over how individuals use or misuse that facility.

    Brief Facts of the Case:

    The complainant subscribed to shaadi.com and made payments to create a matrimonial profile. He alleged that certain users, including one Monika Gupta, shared obscene content and blackmailed him for ₹5,100 and claimed that despite reporting the matter to shaadi[dot]com’s customer support and directly to Anupam Mittal, no effective action was taken. An FIR was lodged, accusing Mittal and others under Sections 420, 384, 507, 120B IPC and Section 67 of the IT Act. Mittal approached the High Court seeking to quash the FIR, asserting protection under Section 79 of the IT Act, which shields intermediaries from liability for user generated actions.

    Issues That Were Before the Court:

    1. Whether shaadi[dot]com qualifies as an intermediary under Section 2(w) of the IT Act.

    2. Whether Anupam Mittal, as CEO, could be personally held responsible for alleged offences by users.

    3. Whether any cognizable offence under IPC or IT Act was made out.

    4. Whether the FIR could be quashed as to Anupam Mittal alone, even if others remained under investigation.

    The Court affirmed that shaadi[dot]com is an intermediary under Section 2(w), a facilitator that merely allows communication between users and does not control the content or conduct of its members and is protected by the Safe Harbour Protection (Section 79 IT Act). Relying heavily on Google India Pvt. Ltd. v. Visaka Industries (2020) 4 SCC 162 and Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1, the Court observed that intermediaries are immune from liability as long as they do not initiate or alter content transmission, observe due diligence and publish user policies, and take down content only upon a court or government order. Since none of these conditions were violated, the Court held that shaadi.com enjoyed full statutory protection. The Court quashed the FIR against Anupam Mittal, emphasizing that intermediaries cannot be held liable for thirdparty user actions when due diligence is followed.

    The judgment strengthens the legal armour around digital intermediaries, reaffirming that online platforms cannot be dragged into criminal litigation for user behaviour. For everyday users, however, it serves as a warning, these portals promise safety but bear no legal responsibility for your emotional, financial, or reputational loss. In cases of fraud or exploitation, victims often discover that the law places the platform outside the line of fire, leaving them to pursue individual offenders who may be untraceable or fictitious.

    The Court’s interpretation, while legally sound, underscores a pressing need for stronger regulatory oversight to ensure user protection without stifling innovation. For users, it’s a sobering reminder that on the internet, safety is a personal responsibility, not a platform guarantee.

  • India–EFTA Trade Deal Comes Into Force: $100 Billion Investment & 1 Million Jobs Expected

    The India–European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement (TEPA) officially comes into force today, 1 October 2025. This is the binding commitments on investment and job creation.

    So for India it means FDI boost of $100 billion in capital inflows over 15 years and 1 million direct jobs. Also, Indian goods gain entry to high-value European markets. 

    As per the Govt. official press release, India’s interests in generic medicines and concerns related to evergreening of patents have been fully addressed and that TEPA ensures IPR commitments at TRIPS level between signatories.

    What is evergreening?  It is the practice of extending a patent’s life for a high-profit drug (medicine), by filing for new patents on minor or insignificant changes by pharmaceuticals. This allows a company to maintain its market monopoly and revenue stream, delaying the entry of more affordable generic competition after the original patent expires. India’s stand has been against this practice, since it delays the entry of Indian low cost generic medicines in market. 

    The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) is distinct from the European Union and comprises four advanced economies with high purchasing power. Among EFTA countries, Switzerland is the largest trading partner of India followed by Norway. Under the agreement, the four EFTA nations, Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein have pledged to promote investments worth USD 100 billion in India over 15 years, with half the amount in the first decade. These investments are expected to create 1 million direct jobs, offering a massive boost to India’s manufacturing and services sectors.

    Under TEPA, EFTA has offered 92.2% of tariff lines encompassing 99.6% of India’s exports. Includes 100% of non-agricultural products and tariff concessions on Processed Agricultural Products (PAP).

    India has offered commitments in 105 sub-sectors, while EFTA commitments include 128 (Switzerland), 114 (Norway), 107 (Liechtenstein), 110 (Iceland). TEPA enables Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) in professional services.

  • Understanding Sahyog Portal Case (Timeline): X Corp (Twitter) vs Union of India

    The dispute between X Corp (formerly Twitter, owned by Elon Musk) and the Government of India highlights the tension around social media regulation in India. At the heart of the controversy is the Sahyog portal, a centralised system for issuing content takedown orders against unlawful or harmful online posts. Here is the chronological explanation of the issue.

    The foundation of India’s digital regulation lies in the Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act). Section 69A of IT Act empowers the government to block online content but requires procedural safeguards,

    Section 69A:

    Power to issue directions for blocking for public access of any information through any computer resource.

    (1) Where the Central Government or any of its officers specially authorised by it in this behalf is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do, in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, defence of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to above, it may subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), for reasons to be recorded in writing, by order, direct any agency of the Government or intermediary to block for access by the public or cause to be blocked for access by the public any information generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted in any computer resource.
    (2) The procedure and safeguards subject to which such blocking for access by the public may be carried out, shall be such as may be prescribed.
    (3) The intermediary who fails to comply with the direction issued under sub-section (1) shall be punished with an imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and also be liable to fine.

    While section 69A gives government the authority to block content, Section 79 the said Act, grants safe harbour protection to intermediaries like Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram, provided they comply with certain obligations.

    This means that platforms like X, Facebook, or Instagram are not held legally liable for the content posted by their users, provided they follow certain due diligence requirements laid down by law.

    Section 79: Exemption from liability of intermediary in certain cases.–

    (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force but subject to the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3), an intermediary shall not be liable for any third party information, data, or communication link made available or hosted by him.
    (2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply if–
    (a) the function of the intermediary is limited to providing access to a communication system over which information made available by third parties is transmitted or temporarily stored or hosted; or
    (b) the intermediary does not–
    (i) initiate the transmission,
    (ii) select the receiver of the transmission, and
    (iii) select or modify the information contained in the transmission;
    (c) the intermediary observes due diligence while discharging his duties under this Act and also observes such other guidelines as the Central Government may prescribe in this behalf
    .

    (3) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply if–
    (a) the intermediary has conspired or abetted or aided or induced, whether by threats or promise or otherwise in the commission of the unlawful act;
    (b) upon receiving actual knowledge, or on being notified by the appropriate Government or its agency that any information, data or communication link residing in or connected to a computer resource controlled by the intermediary is being used to commit the unlawful act, the intermediary fails to expeditiously remove or disable access to that material on that resource without vitiating the evidence in any manner
    .

    Thus this immunity under section 79 is not absolute, if an intermediary fails to act on valid government or court orders to remove unlawful content, it can lose this protection and be held responsible for the objectionable material hosted on its platform

    The 2015 Supreme Court Judgment in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, is vital to this discussion as it became a turning point in India’s digital speech jurisprudence. The challenge arose against Section 66A of the IT Act, which criminalised sending “grossly offensive,” “annoying,” or “menacing” messages online.

    The vague wording of the law led to arbitrary arrests of citizens, including two young women in Maharashtra who were detained over a Facebook post. A law student Shreya Singhal filed a Public Interest Litigation before the Supreme Court, arguing that Section 66A violated the constitutional right to freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a) of Constitution of India and could not be justified under the “reasonable restrictions” of Article 19(2).

    By this judgment, the Supreme Court struck down Section 66A as unconstitutional, holding that the provision was vague and overly broad,. The Court made it clear that only speech which falls within the specific grounds of Article 19(2), such as public order, defamation, or national security can be restricted. At the same time, the Court clarified that intermediaries like social media platforms are required to remove content only when directed by a court or a government authority under Section 69A of the IT Act, thereby ensuring procedural safeguards against arbitrary censorship. This ruling remains the cornerstone for all subsequent debates on online free expression and intermediary liability in India, including the ongoing controversy over the government’s Sahyog portal.

    2021 witnessed the regulatory framework tightened when the government notified the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021. These rules introduced strict requirements such as faster takedowns, grievance redressal mechanisms, and traceability of messages. While the government justified the rules as essential for accountability, major platforms expressed concerns about it’s overreach.

    In October 2024, The Union Home Ministry launched the “Sahyog” portal, an online platform for government agencies and law enforcement to coordinate with social media intermediaries for content takedowns. Critics argued that the portal created a “parallel mechanism” for censorship, bypassing the procedural safeguards built into Section 69A.

    In March 2025, X Corp. (formerly Twitter) filed a petition before the Karnataka High Court challenging the legality of the Sahyog portal. It argued that Sahyog was ultra vires the IT Act 2000, inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s Shreya Singhal ruling, and a violation of users’ right to free expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution.

    The government, however, defended the system as lawful, necessary to combat misinformation and unlawful content, and insisted that foreign companies like X Corp cannot invoke Article 19 rights meant for Indian citizens.

    On September 24, 2025, the Karnataka High Court ruled in favour of the government and dismissed X Corp’s petition. The court upheld the legality of the Sahyog portal under Section 79(3)(b) and the IT Rules, 2021, stressing that social media platforms in India must accept regulation.

    The court emphasised the necessity of regulating social media, particularly concerning offenses against women, stating that online freedom must be balanced with responsibility.  The judgment underlined that foreign intermediaries cannot claim constitutional free speech rights in India.

    Following the adverse judgment in the Karnataka High Court, X Corp. has the option to appeal against the ruling.

  • Delhi HC Questions Trade Marks Registry’s Search Process in Ashiana Ispat v. Kamdhenu (2025)

    The Delhi High Court in Ashiana Ispat Ltd. v. Kamdhenu Ltd. (2025) placed the functioning of the Indian Trade Marks Registry under sharp scrutiny. The Division Bench questioned how the Registry conducts its search for earlier similar/identical marks before issuing examination reports or advertising applications and reaffirmed the mandatory duty under Rule 33 of Trademark Rules, and clarified the law on writ maintainability despite statutory opposition remedies.

     

    The High Court Division Bench comprising Justice C. Hari Shankar and Justice Om Prakash Shukla, on 3 September 2025, delivered a significant ruling in Ashiana Ispat Limited v. Kamdhenu Limited & Ors., LPA 407/2025. At its heart, the case was not merely a dispute between two steel manufacturers over the mark “AL KAMDHENU GOLD”, but a direct judicial spotlight on how the Indian Trade Marks Registry performs its statutory duty of searching and citing rival marks. Perhaps the first time in recent memory, the Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks and Registry officials were asked to explain and demonstrate how the Registry identifies deceptively similar marks before accepting or advertising an application.

    Question arose on the internal mechanics of the Registry’s search process, forcing senior officers to file affidavits and even conduct live demonstrations of the search used to screen new applications. It underscores that advertising a mark is not a mechanical act, the Registrar must apply his mind under Section 20 of the Trade Marks Act and Rule 33 of the Rules to identify conflicting earlier marks.

    The decision affirms that when the Registry fails in this duty, affected proprietors need not wait for the lengthy opposition process; they can approach the High Court under Article 226. This makes the case a precedent on Registry accountability and raises the bar for procedural rigor in trademark examination.

     Facts of the case:

    Ashiana Ispat filed five applications for the mark “AL KAMDHENU GOLD.” The Trade Marks Registry advertised three applications and issued examination report in two others , but failed to cite several of Kamdhenu’s earlier registered marks.

    Kamdhenu filed writ petitions before Delhi High Court, arguing that the Registry’s omissions undermined the integrity of the trademark system.  The Single Judge remanded all applications for de novo consideration after the Registry admitted lapses, withdrew one acceptance order, and initiated administrative action against examiners.

    Aggrieved, Ashiana preferred appeal ( LPAs before the Division Bench), contending it was not allowed to file a counter-affidavit before its rights were prejudiced.

    Main Issues before the division bench:

    Maintainability of the writ petitions: Whether writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution were maintainable in light of the alternative statutory remedy of opposition under Section 21 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

    Entertainability of the writ petitions: Even if maintainable, should the Single Judge have exercised discretion to entertain them, given that opposition proceedings were available?

    Procedural fairness to the appellant (Ashiana): Whether the Single Judge erred in remanding the trademark applications to the Registrar without allowing Ashiana (the applicant of the impugned marks) to file a counter-affidavit and place its version on record.

    Scope of the Registry’s duty under Rule 33 and Section 20: Whether the Trade Marks Registry failed in its statutory duty to search and cite earlier marks when issuing FERs or advertising Ashiana’s applications, and whether such lapses justified judicial intervention.

    Extent of judicial review at the advertisement/FER stage: To what degree can courts interfere with or supervise the Registry’s internal process of examination, acceptance, and advertisement of trademark applications at a pre-opposition stage?

    Division Bench Observations and Ruling:

    On Maintainability of the writ petitions, the Bench stressed the settled distinction between maintainability and entertainability. Relying on Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. Excise & Taxation Officer and State of Himachal Pradesh v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement, it held that the existence of an alternative remedy (opposition under Section 21 of the TMA) is not an absolute bar to filing a writ petition. Maintainability relates to jurisdiction; entertainability relates to discretion. The Court ruled in favour of writ petitions in such cases being maintainable in law.

    On question whether the Single Judge was justified in exercising writ jurisdiction despite the availability of opposition proceedings, The Court left this question open, because the appellant (Ashiana) was not given a chance to file its counter-affidavit. The Division Bench criticised the Single Judge’s approach, with the reasoning that hearing the appellant’s counsel orally is not a substitute for giving an opportunity to file a counter-affidavit. An affected party has a right to put its case on affidavit before any adverse order is passed. Single Judge’s order of 28 May 2025 was quashed and set aside Ashiana granted time to file a counter-affidavit.

    On question of Scope of Registry’s duty under Rule 33 / Section 20, the court held that  the Registrar is under a mandatory duty to search for and cite earlier marks that are identical or deceptively similar sicnce advertising a mark is not a mechanical act, it requires application of mind. The Trademark Registry’s affidavit and demonstration showed lapses, and even disciplinary action was taken against examiners. The Bench referred to coordinate bench rulings (Jai Bhagwan Gupta v. Registrar of Trade MarksKaira District Coop. Milk Producers Union) emphasising tthat examination report must disclose reasons and cannot omit rival marks.

    On another vital question of Extent of judicial review at advertisement/examination stage, the Court held that Judicial review is available where there is procedural dereliction or non-application of mind by the Registry. However, the Division Bench clarified that no final finding was recorded on whether Ashiana’s mark was deceptively similar to Kamdhenu’s, that question is still to be considered.

    Key Takeaway:

    The decision highlights that the Trade Marks Registry cannot treat acceptance or advertisement of marks as a clerical step. The search process must be transparent, thorough, and defensible in court. For trademark owners, the judgment shows that Registry lapses can be challenged directly under Article 226. For the Registry, it is a reminder that its officers’ actions will not escape judicial scrutiny  especially when they involve public-facing functions that determine the fate of brands and market identities.

    By compelling the Registry to demonstrate its search methodology and holding it accountable for omissions, the judgment signals a shift towards greater transparency and higher standards in trademark examination. Going forward, both applicants and opponents can expect the courts to insist that the Registry discharge its statutory obligations diligently making this a landmark moment in Indian trademark jurisprudence.

  • Can Film Titles Be Copyrighted? Lessons from Lootere Dispute and Protecting Movie Names

    Disputes over film and web-series titles are becoming increasingly common in India’s entertainment industry. In Sunil S/o Darshan Saberwal Versus Star India Pvt. Ltd. & Ors, Controversy arose around the title “Lootere”, where the producer of a 1993 Hindi film by the same name sought to restrain Disney+Hotstar and other defendants from streaming a web-series carrying that title.

    The Bombay High Court, in its judgment delivered on 18 August 2025 by Justice Sandeep V. Marne, examined whether copyright subsists in a film title, whether registration with film-producers’ associations creates enforceable rights, and whether the plaintiff was entitled to an interim injunction halting the web-series.The Court had to decide whether the plaintiff could claim exclusive rights in the title “Lootere” based on copyright or association registration, and if so, whether interim relief in the form of an injunction against the web-series was justified.

    The Case:

    The plaintiff, produced the film Lootere in 1993 and later obtained a copyright certificate for the cinematograph film. The title “Lootere” was also registered with various film-producers associations, renewing it to cover feature films, TV serials, web-series, and web films.

    In September 2022, the plaintiff discovered the trailer of a web-series titled “Lootere” set to stream on Disney+Hotstar, and issued a legal notice. The defendants responded but continued production. The web-series premiered on 22 March 2024 and has since been available for streaming.The plaintiff approached Bombay High Court seeking injunction against the defendants from producing or streaming the web-series.

    Court deliberated on various issues, mainly whether copyright subsist in a mere film title under the Copyright Act, 1957 and do registrations with film-producers’ associations create legally enforceable rights against non-members?

    Court’s Observations and Ruling:

    No copyright in mere titles: The Court relied on Apex Court’s decision in Krishika Lulla v. Shyam V. Devkatta and reaffirmed that film titles, being ordinary words, do not attract copyright protection unless exceptionally original.

    Association registration not enforceable against non-members: Registrations with producers’ associations are contractual arrangements binding only within the associations. They do not create statutory rights against outsiders like the defendants.

    Industry practice insufficient: Duplication of titles in the film industry is common, and mere identity of titles does not amount to copyright infringement.

    Delay fatal to injunction: The plaintiff waited for very long after first objecting before filing the suit. By the time of hearing, the web-series had already been streaming, making the relief sought impractical.

    Prima facie case not established: The plaintiff neither demonstrated exclusive statutory rights in the title nor pleaded passing off or trademark infringement. Without a prima facie case, irreparable injury and balance of convenience did not arise.The Court declined to restrain the defendants, noting that the plaintiff may pursue damages but cannot prevent the continued streaming of the web-series.

    The key takeaways from the judgment, can be summarised as , Titles usually lack copyright protection. Indian law does not recognize ordinary film titles as “works” under the Copyright Act and Association registrations are weak shields. While useful as industry notices, such registrations cannot be enforced against non-members in court.

    Protection of Movie Titles:

    To effectively protect a movie name, producers should move beyond association registrations and rely on statutory mechanisms. The most reliable method is trademark registration of the title under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, particularly when the title is distinctive and intended for use across multiple works or merchandise. In addition, producers should act promptly on discovering potential misuse, since delay can defeat injunction claims. Together, these measures provide a far stronger and enforceable shield for safeguarding film and web-series titles than reliance on copyright law, which generally does not protect titles.

    The Lootere case is a reminder that copyright is ill-suited to protect film titles. For the entertainment industry, the judgment signals that association registrations, while valuable internally, carry little weight in court against outsiders. Legal protection of titles must be built on trademarks, goodwill, and timely enforcement.

    The decision is a reaffirmation of settled principles, that a party cannot claim any copyright in the title. The works in which copyright subsist has been set out in Section 13(1) of the Copyright Act, 1957 and which consists of the original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic work; cinematographic film; and sound recording. A title of a work cannot be considered to be the subject-matter of copyright law because a title by itself is in the nature of a name of a work and is not complete by itself, without the work.

  • Calcutta High Court Reaffirms Strict Approach to Section 3(k) (Google LLC v. Controller of Patents)

    The Calcutta High Court in Google LLC v. Controller of Patents (decided on 6 August 2025), has reaffirmed the strict approach to computer-related inventions (CRIs) under Indian patent law.

    Google filed Patent Application No. 2705/KOLNP/2014, titled “A Method for Labelling Visited Locations Based on Contact Information”, which sought to patent a method for tagging user, visited locations with contact labels to improve location-aware services. The Indian Patent Office rejected the application on 3 July 2020, invoking Section 3(k) of the Patents Act, 1970, which excludes “a mathematical or business method or a computer programme per se or algorithms” from patent protection. The application was filed in November 2014.

    The Controller of Patents concluded that the claims were no more than algorithmic processing performed on a single computing device. Functional steps such as “collecting,” “determining,” “associating,” and “outputting” were considered abstract, result oriented descriptions lacking any novel hardware or measurable technical advancement. Additionally, the application suffered from a procedural defect as the Proof of Right document for one inventor was found defective.

    On appeal beforeunder Section 117A of the Patents Act, challenging an order dated 3 July, 2020, passed by the Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs, Google argued that its invention produced a genuine technical effect and offered a technological solution rather than a mere software program. Google relied on precedents such as Ferid Allani v. Union of India (2019), Blackberry Limited v. Controller of Patents (2024), and Microsoft Technology Licensing v. Assistant Controller of Patents (2024), where courts had acknowledged software, related inventions that demonstrated improvement in system performance.

    However, the Calcutta High Court was not convinced. Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur observed that the invention merely automated contextual labelling of location data and amounted to an administrative or management function. Since no technical contribution or hardware integration was disclosed, the invention fell within the exclusion under Section 3(k) of the Patents Act.

    The Court also clarified the role of the CRI Guidelines issued by the Indian Patent Office. While examiners may refer to them, such as the 2017 Guidelines prescribing the three-step test for CRIs, the Court emphasized that these Guidelines are interpretative aids and not binding law. Statutory provisions and judicial precedents continue to take precedence in determining patentability.

    Thus, Section 3(k) continues to present a hurdle, and CRI applications will only succeed if they show a clear technical advancement or improvement beyond generic data processing. Broad, functional claims expressed in abstract language are unlikely to meet this threshold.

    Procedural compliance, including accurate Proof of Right filings, is equally critical. Ultimately, the decision underscores that while computer-related inventions in India may gain protection where genuine technical contributions are shown, courts will apply Section 3(k) strictly to prevent patents on software per se.

  • Territorial Jurisdiction in Patent Suits – Delhi HC’s Ruling in Kubota vs Godabari

    The Delhi High Court in Kubota Corporation vs Godabari Agro Machinery and Services (12 August 2025) dealt with a significant question of territorial jurisdiction in patent infringement suits. The Court was asked to decide whether an “offer for sale” of an allegedly infringing product within Delhi, even without proof of an actual sale, was sufficient to confer jurisdiction. In rejecting the defendant’s objection under Order VII Rule 10 CPC, which governs the return of a plaint when a court finds it lacks the necessary jurisdiction to try the case, the Court reaffirmed that offers for sale of patented products within a forum are enough to establish cause of action, making this judgment a vital precedent for patent holders and businesses facing cross-border infringement disputes in India.

    Kubota is a multinational engaged in manufacturing patented agricultural machinery, particularly self-propelled combine harvesters under the brand name HARVES KING. The defendants comprised a Chinese parent company (Defendant No.3), its overseas subsidiary (Defendant No.2), and an Indian company based in Orissa (Defendant No.1), which imported, assembled, and sold the machines in India.

    The main questions before the Court were whether Delhi High Court had jurisdiction despite the defendants not being based in Delhi, whether an “offer for sale” was sufficient to establish jurisdiction under Section 48 of the Patents Act. As per Section 48(a) of the Patents Act, 1970, a patentee has the exclusive right to prevent third-parties from selling or offering for sale a patented product in India.

    Another question before the Court was whether communications by dealers or distributors could confer jurisdiction, and whether trap transactions carried out by the Plaintiff’s investigators could form the basis for jurisdiction.

    The Court observed that at the stage of an application under Order VII Rule 10 CPC, all averments in the plaint must be assumed to be true. It relied on the investigator’s affidavit and email correspondence, which showed that Defendant No.1’s Sales Manager had offered to deliver the impugned product in Delhi. Section 48 of the Patents Act confers exclusive rights on a patentee not only to prevent sales but also offers for sale of a patented product. Hence, even without actual sales in Delhi, the offer for delivery there created a valid cause of action.

    The Court distinguished precedents such as Kohinoor Seed and Banyan Tree, noting that those cases dealt with mere online listings or website access, while the present case involved a direct offer for supply in Delhi. It further held that Agroharvest Solutions, being a distributor, did not need to be impleaded separately since the communication had been channelled through Defendant No.1’s Sales Manager.

    On this basis, the Court concluded that part of the cause of action had arisen within Delhi under Section 20(c) CPC. The application seeking return of the plaint was dismissed, and the Delhi High Court retained jurisdiction over the suit.

    The key takeaway from this ruling is that in patent infringement suits, even an offer for sale of the infringing product within the forum’s jurisdiction is enough to establish territorial jurisdiction, and an actual sale is not necessary. Courts will accept plaint averments as true at the preliminary stage, and communications made by agents or distributors can be sufficient to show territorial links.

  • Impact of USPTO’s AAPA Restrictions on Patent Drafting

    As per news reports the new USPTO guidance restricts use of Applicant Admitted Prior Art (AAPA) in IPRs. It will no longer qualify as standalone prior art but can be combined with other references.

    If you’re in patents, you’ve likely heard of “Applicant Admitted Prior Art (AAPA)”. This refers to statements in a “patent specification”, where the applicant admits something is already “known” or “conventional.” AAPA is considered risky, mainly because, those statements can later be used against the patent, even if no external prior art is cited. This can be explained as, when you write “It is well known that lithium batteries are used in …”, usage of “well known” can give challengers free prior art ammunition.

    On August 22, 2025, USPTO issued a new guidance memo that significantly limits the types of prior art that can be used in IPR proceedings before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). Effective September 1, 2025, AAPA and general knowledge can no longer be used to establish claim elements or supply missing limitations, even when combined with other prior art. This policy supersedes previous USPTO guidance and narrows interpretations by the Federal Circuit in Qualcomm Inc. V. Apple Inc.

    Earlier the disputes between Qualcomm and Apple led to the court had holding that AAPA could be used as part of an obviousness challenge in IPRs. This alarmed applicants because casual wording in the background section could tank a patent years later. As per the new USPTO guidance (Aug 2025), The Office has now restricted AAPA’s use in IPRs. It clarified that:

    AAPA cannot serve as standalone prior art for invalidating claims.

    It may only be used to interpret claim scope or in combination with other prior art references.

    Patent Drafting Tips:

    This is a big relief for applicants, but smart drafting remains the best shield. While drafting patent specification, it is important to:

    Avoid saying “well known” or “conventional.”

    Cite published patents/literature instead of making admissions.

    A disclaimer can be added that the discussion of prior art should not be construed as an admission that it is prior art under applicable law.

  • Understanding Zero FIR under BNSS Section 173

    Three new Criminal laws were notified by the Government of India on 25th December 2023, Indian Penal Code, 1861 (IPC) was replaced by The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita-2023 (BNS), Criminal Procedure Code,1973 (CrPC) was replaced by The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023 (BNSS) and The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 was replaced by The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam-2023 (BSA).

    BNSS which replaced CrPC has the provisions of registration of a cognizable offence under section 173 (earlier section 154 CrPC).

    What Is a Zero FIR?

    On the receipt of any information regarding the commission of cognizable offence which has been committed outside of the territorial jurisdiction of that police station, the officer on duty records the details of the complaint in the Zero FIR register, irrespective of the jurisdiction. The case is registered as Zero FIR or ‘O’ FIR under relevant sections of law. Meaning that a Zero FIR (First Information Report) is a statutory provision under Section 173(1) of the BNSS, 2023, allowing a person to report a cognizable offence at any police station, irrespective of where the crime occurred. It’s initially recorded with a “Zero” prefix and later transferred to the appropriate jurisdictional station for further action. 

    Legal Foundation in BNSS

    BNSS replaces CrPC, updating FIR protocol with the following:

    Section 173(1) enables oral or electronic recording of cognizable offences at any police station, regardless of location

    Section 173(2) complainants must receive a free copy of the FIR.

    Section 173(3) for offences punishable between 3 to 7 years, police may conduct a preliminary enquiry (within 14 days) before registering a full FIR, with DSP approval.

    Section 173(4) if police refuse to register, the complainant can escalate the matter to the SP or Magistrate. 

    Step-by-Step Procedure:

    1. Complainant Lodges Complaint: Approach any police station and report a cognizable offence. The SHO or officer on duty must record the statement verbatim, either orally or via e-communication and read it back for signature. 

    2. Zero FIR Registration: The FIR is numbered with “Zero” to indicate jurisdictional transfer. The complainant gets a free copy immediately.

    3. Preliminary Enquiry (If Applicable): For offences punishable by 3–7 years, the officer-in-charge of police station may initiate a preliminary enquiry with DSP approval to determine if a full investigation is warranted.

    4. Transfer to Jurisdictional Station: The Zero FIR is officially forwarded to the correct station, which then re-registers it as a full FIR and assigns an Investigating Officer (IO).

    5. Formal Investigation: The IO conducts the investigation as per BNSS guidelines, collecting evidence, arresting suspects if needed, and updating the complainant. 

    Why Zero FIR Under BNSS Matters?

    Instant Access to Justice: It removes delays caused by jurisdictional confusion and is vital in urgent or sensitive cases.                  

    Victim Protection: It ensures immediate official acknowledgment and prevents evidence tampering.                             

    Legal Backing: It is codified under BNSS, unlike the previous CrPC era practice. Provides for accountability mechanism. It sets clear redressal path if FIR registration is refused and complainant can escalate to SP or Magistrate. 

    What Happens After Registration?

    Zero FIR Logged: It is documented in a special register and free FIR copy given to the complainant.

    Preliminary enquiry, if required, within 14 days to confirm prima facie merit. Thereafter the FIR is transferred and re-registered  by forwarding to territorial police station. Re-registration is under regular FIR numbering.

    Investigation conducted by assigned investigating officer primarily includes evidence gathering, witness interviews, medical exams, arrests.

    FAQs Around Zero FIR

    Can any cognizable offence be reported via Zero FIR and does preliminary enquiry applies?

    Yes. If punishment is up to 7 years, a preliminary enquiry may be applied. Otherwise, full FIR is registered immediately.

    What if police refuse to register?

    You can file a complaint with the Superintendent of Police (SP) or approach the Magistrate as provided under BNSS Section 173(4).

    Is e‑FIR available?

    Yes, BNSS allows FIR registration via electronic portals, with the complainant required to sign the paper copy within three days. 

    Zero FIR under the BNSS is a powerful tool ensuring justice is not hindered by administrative boundaries. It guarantees immediate complaint registration, confirms a complainant’s right to a free copy, allows preliminary checks for mid-grade offences, and mandates smooth transfer and investigation, all backed by clear escalation channels.

  • How to Create a Unique Trademark in India To Avoid Rejection of Trademark Application: A Guide

    Are you aware that large number of Trademark Applications get objected to at the initial stage by the Indian Trademark Office? Learn how to create a unique Trademark to increase the chances of it getting registered.

    A trademark should be unique as it identifies and distinguishes your goods or services from competitors. Under the Indian Trademarks Act, 1999, there are various components that you can include in your trademark.

    There are benefits of going beyond Trademark that includes only words, because creating a Trademark using only words, may increase chances of it resulting into being same or similar to any prior existing Trademark, which will be objected by the Indian Trademark Office.

    In this article, we will discuss:

    ✅ What can be registered as a trademark under the Indian Trademarks Act, 1999

    ✅ Best practices to improve the chances of approval by the Indian Trademark Office

    A. What Can Be Registered as a Trademark in India?

    Let’s understand what are the allowed Components that can be incorporated into a Trademark (As per Section 2 of the Trademarks Act, 1999) –

    Words & Names: Unique names, words, or coined terms (e.g., Google, Tata).

    Logos & Symbols: Distinctive graphic designs or emblems.

    Taglines & Slogans: Catchy phrases that define the brand (e.g., Nike’s “Just Do It”).

    Letters & Numerals: Can be registered if they have distinctiveness (e.g., 7-Eleven).

    Shapes of Goods: Unique product packaging shapes (e.g., the Coca-Cola bottle).

    Sound Marks: Unique sounds associated with the brand (e.g., Nokia ringtone).

    Colors & Combinations: A specific color scheme associated with the brand (e.g., Cadbury’s purple).

    Three-Dimensional Marks: 3D product features that are unique.

    Motion Marks: Logos or animations that change over time.

    B. What Cannot Be Registered as a Trademark?

    (Section 9 of the Act)

    After understanding what can be included in your Trademark, let’s also see what you cannot include to prevent objection to its Registration:

    ❌ Generic terms (e.g., “Soap” for a soap brand)

    ❌ Deceptive marks (misleading public)

    ❌ Offensive or immoral words/symbols

    ❌ Names of places or common surnames

    ❌ National symbols (e.g., Ashoka Chakra, National Emblem)

    ❌ Identical marks already registered

    Now let’s see how to further improve the chances of your Trademark being approved.

    C. How to Create a Trademark That Gets Approved?

    Step 1: Brainstorm & Choose a Unique Trademark

    ✔ Avoid common words or generic terms.

    ✔ Create a coined word (e.g., Kodak, Xerox).

    ✔ Combine words in an unusual way (e.g., FaceBook).

    ✔ Check phonetic uniqueness (e.g., “Kwik” instead of “Quick”). Example: Instead of naming a clothing brand “Fashion Wear,” use “Fashique” for uniqueness.

    Step 2: Conduct a Trademark Search

    If a similar mark exists, modify yours for uniqueness.

    Step 3: Select the Right Trademark Class –

    India follows the Nice Classification system with 45 classes.

    – Classes 1-34 cover products, and classes 35-45 cover services. – Choosing the wrong class can lead to rejection.

    Example:

    Class 25: Clothing brands

    Class 9: Software and electronics

    Class 41: Education and training

    Step 4: Design a Trademark Logo (If Applicable)

    If registering a logo, ensure it’s distinctive and visually appealing.

    Avoid generic symbols like “stars, globes, or check marks”.

    – Use high-resolution graphics for clarity.

    Example: Apple’s bitten apple logo is simple yet unique.

    Step 5: File the Trademark Application. There are two filing options:

    ✅ Online Filing (via IP India website) – Recommended for faster processing.

    ✅ Offline Filing (through Trademark Office) – Slower and requires physical submission.

    Government Fees: –

    ₹4,500 for individuals/startups (online filing)

    ₹9,000 for companies (online filing)

    Upon submission of TrademarkApplication, you’ll receive a Trademark Application number.

    Step 6: Trademark Examination & Reply to Objections

    The Trademark Office examines your application and may raise objections under the following sections of Trademark Act: –

    Section 9 (lack of distinctiveness)

    Section 11 (similar marks already exist)

    How to improve approval chances?

    ✔ Ensure uniqueness before applying.

    ✔ If objected, respond with legal arguments and proof of distinctiveness.

    ✔ Submit proof of prior use (invoices, ads, domain name) if applicable.

    Step 7: Publication in Trademark Journal

    If no objections, your trademark is published in the Trademark Journal

    Waiting period:

    4 months for any opposition from the public.

    If no opposition, your trademark moves to registration.

    Step 8: Trademark Registration & Certificate

    If there’s no opposition, the Trademark Office grants registration. You receive a Trademark Registration Certificate (TM-RC).

    Your trademark is now legally protected for 10 years (renewable).

    D. Tips to Improve Trademark Acceptance Rate

    ✔ Ensure uniqueness before applying.

    ✔ Use invented words rather than descriptive ones.

    ✔ Avoid similarities with existing marks.

    ✔ Choose the correct class of goods/services.

    ✔ File early to secure priority rights.

    ✔ Respond promptly to objections and legal notices.

    E. Benefits of Trademark Registration in India

    ✅ Legal protection against copycats.

    ✅ Brand recognition and customer trust.

    ✅ Exclusive rights for 10 years (renewable).

    ✅ Valuable business asset (can be sold/licensed).

    ✅ Helps in global registration (via Madrid Protocol).

    Creating a strong, legally valid trademark is crucial for brand protection in India. By following the right process, choosing a unique mark, and addressing legal requirements, you can significantly improve the chances of approval by the Indian Trademark Office.