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Moral Rights, Performers’ Rights and Copyright: Creative Ownership in Indian Music
Every work of art has three aspects tying it to its creator , the “right to own it”, the “right to be recognised for it”, and the “right to perform it”. In law, these are called “copyright”, “moral rights”, and “performer’s rights” respectively. Together they governs how creative works are owned, shared, and remembered.
Copyright law is designed to protect originality, to ensure that the person who creates a melody, writes a poem, or paints a canvas can control its use. For example, when a musician composes an original score for a film, or when a painter paints a canvas, their creations are protected as copyright works.
Under the Copyright Act, 1957, this protection lasts for 60 years after the author’s death, allowing the creator (or their heirs) to control how the work is used, licensed, or reproduced.
Moral rights, on the other hand, evolved to preserve the bond of honour between an author and their work, even when they no longer own the economic rights.
For instance, a painter after selling the painting or a singer in Indian movie album, , still retained the right to be recognised as its creator and to object if the art-work was distorted or defaced.
These rights, defined under Section 57, also last for the author’s lifetime plus 60 years, ensuring that reputation outlives ownership.Performer’s rights came later, acknowledging that an artist’s live expression, the voice that brings a song to life, also deserves protection. When Lata Mangeshkar sang a composition, or a classical dancer performs a piece, their performance itself becomes a creative act.
Under Sections 38 to 38B, performers enjoy rights over their recorded performances for 50 years from the year of performance, including the right to be identified and to prevent unauthorised recordings or distortions.
Indian Classical Rendition-Copyright And Performer’s Rights
Each of the discussed three rights spring from the same root, yet their boundaries often blur. When we look at the Indian classical reditions, the question arises that what happens when art is not created in isolation but drawn from centuries of tradition? Can an artist claim copyright over a raga, a chant, or a hymn that has travelled through generations? Does originality lie in the composition, or in the performance that reinterprets it?
The case before Delhi High Court involving dispute between A.R. Rahman and Faiyaz Wasifuddin Daga, questioned who truly owns music born from heritage.
The controversy centred around the celebrated song “Veera Raja Veera” from Ponniyin Selvan II, composed by Rahman, and an old Dhrupad piece “Shiva Stuti,” performed decades earlier by the legendary Junior Dagar brothers. The Dagar family claimed that Rahman’s composition reproduced their work almost note for note.Initially, the Delhi High Court agreed and directed Rahman and his producers to deposit ₹2 crore and credit the Dagars in the film. But the Division Bench later reversed this, holding that while the Dagars had performed the piece, they had not proved they “composed” it.
That distinction lies at the heart of copyright.
Under the “Copyright Act, 1957”, the “author” of a musical work , the composer , owns the right to reproduce and adapt it. If the work is part of an ancient or traditional repertoire, it belongs to the “public domain”. The court found that “Shiva Stuti” was a Dhrupad chant handed down through generations, not a private creation. Hence, no exclusive copyright could exist. Rahman’s composition, even if inspired by the same tradition, was therefore legally independent.
This ruling brought to light a subtle but crucial truth about creativity, that authorship and performance, though intertwined, are not the same. The law draws a fine line between creating a work and expressing it. While copyright guards the composer’s structure of notes, rhythm, and arrangement, it does not extend to the individuality of a performance that brings those notes to life. It is in this space between authorship and interpretation that performers’ rights find their voice.
Performers’ rights, introduced in “1994” and strengthened in “2012”, protect a different kind of creativity, the “interpretation”. When a singer, dancer, or instrumentalist performs a work, they invest originality in tone, rhythm, and emotion. Sections 38 to 38B grant them rights to be identified as the performer, to prevent distortion of their recorded performance, and in some cases, to share royalties. But these rights do not make them the authors of the composition itself. The Dagar family’s claim, was caught in this distinction, they were heirs to great performers, not proven composers.
Running parallel to both Copyright and Performer’s rights is the doctrine of “moral rights” under “Section 57” , a uniquely personal safeguard that survives even after copyright transfer. Moral rights protect an author’s connection to their work through two principles, the right of “paternity” (to be credited) and the right of “integrity” (to prevent distortion). It was this moral impulse that led the single judge in the Rahman dispute to order that the Junior Dagar brothers be credited in the film.
Later when the appellate court examined the issue, it held that moral rights arise only if authorship is first established. Without proof of who composed “Shiva Stuti”, the claim to moral authorship could not stand.
Each right operates within its own register. “Copyright” secures authorship and commercial control. “Performers’ rights” celebrate expression and performance. “Moral rights” preserve honour and attribution. In a country like India , where art often flows through oral traditions and collective memory, identifying authorship can be legally complex and emotionally charged. Folk songs, classical ragas, and devotional hymns belong to everyone and to no one at once, leaving courts to walk a fine line between preserving heritage and rewarding innovation.
For today’s creators, the lesson is clear. Document authorship with precision , notations, recordings, and dated drafts establish originality better than memory. Acknowledge influences, even if the law does not compel it, cultural respect often prevents legal conflict. When collaborating, define who is the composer, lyricist, and performer and most importantly copyright registration is the demand of the changing times.
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Centre Offers Article 371 to Ladakh: What It Means for Statehood and Sixth Schedule Demands
As per new reports, in recent talks, the central government has indicated that it could consider extending Article 371 special provisions to Ladakh, as a possible way to address the demands. The Ladakhi groups (LAB, KDA) continue to demand statehood plus Sixth Schedule status. Here’s a breakdown of what’s going on and what the offer from the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) means
On 31st October 2019, the former state of Jammu & Kashmir was reorganised under the Jammu & Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019 into two Union Territories (UTs), one being Ladakh. Unlike some UTs, Ladakh does not have its own legislative assembly. It is directly administered by a Lieutenant Governor and central government.
Local groups in Ladakh, notably the Leh Apex Body (LAB) and the Kargil Democratic Alliance (KDA), have demanded statehood for Ladakh (i.e., become a state, with its own legislature) and inclusion under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution of India (which provides for special autonomous district/tribal councils) to protect land, jobs, culture and resources.
The major unrest on 24 September 2025 due to protests in Leh led to four people being killed in clashes with police. This escalated urgency for talks. Following that, the central government resumed talks with Ladakhi groups after a break, to discuss constitutional safeguards.
What is Article 371 of the Constitution of India?
Article 371 of the Indian Constitution contains special provisions for several states to address their unique developmental, cultural and security concerns. This Article allows for “asymmetric federalism,” where not all states are treated equally, and special arrangements are made to accommodate their specific needs within the broader framework of the Indian Union. While Article 371 was part of the original Constitution for Maharashtra and Gujarat, other states were added through subsequent amendments, with provisions ranging from Article 371A to 371J
Article 371 has provided “temporary, transitional and special arrangements” for specific states in India (mostly in the north-east) to protect local interests such as land, culture and jobs. It gives powers such as, local legislation for specified areas, additional protection for customary laws, control over land-ownership or transfer etc in some states. It is less extensive than the Sixth Schedule autonomy. Sixth Schedule provides for democratic bodies (Autonomous District Councils) with legislative, judicial and executive powers in tribal areas.
Article 371 could address various Ladakhi concerns such as protection of land and resources from outside settlement/investment, given strategic, ecological and cultural sensitivity of the region, priority for locals in jobs, who gets domicile status, who can apply for jobs, local governance and decision-making etc
Offering Article 371 may be seen as bringing constitutional guarantee of better protection. If granted, possible implications include, Ladakh getting legal protection for land, jobs, maybe stronger local councils, maybe legislative powers for certain areas. That would strengthen safeguards for locals. It will not make Ladakh a State (it would remain UT). For the central government this might be a way to defuse unrest in Ladakh by offering something substantive, without committing to full statehood which could mean many logistical, political, strategic implications.
As talks between the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and Ladakhi leaders continue, the future of Ladakh hangs in the balance. Extending Article 371 could bring long-awaited constitutional protections and help calm tensions in the region, the outcome will shape not only Ladakh’s governance but also India’s broader approach to balancing national control with regional aspirations.
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Beware of The Risks Matrimonial Websites Pose & The Law Which Protects Such Websites shaadi[dot]com case
The illusion of “safe” matchmaking is dangerous indeed, in an era where technology claims to bridge hearts, India’s online matrimonial platforms have transformed the search for life partners into a digital transaction. With glossy interfaces and promises of “verified profiles,” these portals appear as safe havens for those seeking companionship. But behind this comforting illusion lies a perilous reality, stories of fraud, blackmail, extortion, and emotional abuse have become disturbingly common. Individuals, often genuinely searching for love and trust, fall prey to predators hiding behind curated online profiles.What makes this digital danger even more troubling is that these platforms are legally insulated from responsibility. Under India’s Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act), they are classified as “intermediaries”, mere facilitators of user interaction and hence cannot be held liable for the criminal acts, obscenity, or exploitation committed by users on their platforms. This immunity, called the “safe harbour” protection under Section 79 of the IT Act, means that while victims suffer real harm, the platforms that host these interactions walk free of legal accountability.
In Anupam Mittal v. State of U.P. and Others (Allahabad High Court, 26 September 2025), bench comprising Justice Siddhartha Varma and Justice Madan Pal Singh had to decide on this uneasy truth. The Court quashed criminal proceedings against shaadi.com founder Anupam Mittal, reaffirming that platforms like his cannot be prosecuted for the misdeeds of their users. The ruling highlights the yawning gap between user vulnerability and platform immunity, a gap that continues to grow as human relationships migrate online.
Core issue was can platform owners be criminally liable for user misconduct? The Court had to decide whether the CEO of an online matchmaking platform could be held criminally responsible for offences like obscenity, extortion, or cheating allegedly committed by users on that platform. The petitioner, Anupam Mittal, argued that shaadi[dot]com merely provides the digital infrastructure for users to connect and that he, as the platform’s head, had no control over how individuals use or misuse that facility.
Brief Facts of the Case:
The complainant subscribed to shaadi.com and made payments to create a matrimonial profile. He alleged that certain users, including one Monika Gupta, shared obscene content and blackmailed him for ₹5,100 and claimed that despite reporting the matter to shaadi[dot]com’s customer support and directly to Anupam Mittal, no effective action was taken. An FIR was lodged, accusing Mittal and others under Sections 420, 384, 507, 120B IPC and Section 67 of the IT Act. Mittal approached the High Court seeking to quash the FIR, asserting protection under Section 79 of the IT Act, which shields intermediaries from liability for user generated actions.
Issues That Were Before the Court:
1. Whether shaadi[dot]com qualifies as an intermediary under Section 2(w) of the IT Act.
2. Whether Anupam Mittal, as CEO, could be personally held responsible for alleged offences by users.
3. Whether any cognizable offence under IPC or IT Act was made out.
4. Whether the FIR could be quashed as to Anupam Mittal alone, even if others remained under investigation.
The Court affirmed that shaadi[dot]com is an intermediary under Section 2(w), a facilitator that merely allows communication between users and does not control the content or conduct of its members and is protected by the Safe Harbour Protection (Section 79 IT Act). Relying heavily on Google India Pvt. Ltd. v. Visaka Industries (2020) 4 SCC 162 and Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1, the Court observed that intermediaries are immune from liability as long as they do not initiate or alter content transmission, observe due diligence and publish user policies, and take down content only upon a court or government order. Since none of these conditions were violated, the Court held that shaadi.com enjoyed full statutory protection. The Court quashed the FIR against Anupam Mittal, emphasizing that intermediaries cannot be held liable for thirdparty user actions when due diligence is followed.
The judgment strengthens the legal armour around digital intermediaries, reaffirming that online platforms cannot be dragged into criminal litigation for user behaviour. For everyday users, however, it serves as a warning, these portals promise safety but bear no legal responsibility for your emotional, financial, or reputational loss. In cases of fraud or exploitation, victims often discover that the law places the platform outside the line of fire, leaving them to pursue individual offenders who may be untraceable or fictitious.
The Court’s interpretation, while legally sound, underscores a pressing need for stronger regulatory oversight to ensure user protection without stifling innovation. For users, it’s a sobering reminder that on the internet, safety is a personal responsibility, not a platform guarantee.
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India–EFTA Trade Deal Comes Into Force: $100 Billion Investment & 1 Million Jobs Expected
The India–European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement (TEPA) officially comes into force today, 1 October 2025. This is the binding commitments on investment and job creation.
So for India it means FDI boost of $100 billion in capital inflows over 15 years and 1 million direct jobs. Also, Indian goods gain entry to high-value European markets.
As per the Govt. official press release, India’s interests in generic medicines and concerns related to evergreening of patents have been fully addressed and that TEPA ensures IPR commitments at TRIPS level between signatories.
What is evergreening? It is the practice of extending a patent’s life for a high-profit drug (medicine), by filing for new patents on minor or insignificant changes by pharmaceuticals. This allows a company to maintain its market monopoly and revenue stream, delaying the entry of more affordable generic competition after the original patent expires. India’s stand has been against this practice, since it delays the entry of Indian low cost generic medicines in market.
The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) is distinct from the European Union and comprises four advanced economies with high purchasing power. Among EFTA countries, Switzerland is the largest trading partner of India followed by Norway. Under the agreement, the four EFTA nations, Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein have pledged to promote investments worth USD 100 billion in India over 15 years, with half the amount in the first decade. These investments are expected to create 1 million direct jobs, offering a massive boost to India’s manufacturing and services sectors.
Under TEPA, EFTA has offered 92.2% of tariff lines encompassing 99.6% of India’s exports. Includes 100% of non-agricultural products and tariff concessions on Processed Agricultural Products (PAP).
India has offered commitments in 105 sub-sectors, while EFTA commitments include 128 (Switzerland), 114 (Norway), 107 (Liechtenstein), 110 (Iceland). TEPA enables Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) in professional services.
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Delhi HC Questions Trade Marks Registry’s Search Process in Ashiana Ispat v. Kamdhenu (2025)
The Delhi High Court in Ashiana Ispat Ltd. v. Kamdhenu Ltd. (2025) placed the functioning of the Indian Trade Marks Registry under sharp scrutiny. The Division Bench questioned how the Registry conducts its search for earlier similar/identical marks before issuing examination reports or advertising applications and reaffirmed the mandatory duty under Rule 33 of Trademark Rules, and clarified the law on writ maintainability despite statutory opposition remedies.
The High Court Division Bench comprising Justice C. Hari Shankar and Justice Om Prakash Shukla, on 3 September 2025, delivered a significant ruling in Ashiana Ispat Limited v. Kamdhenu Limited & Ors., LPA 407/2025. At its heart, the case was not merely a dispute between two steel manufacturers over the mark “AL KAMDHENU GOLD”, but a direct judicial spotlight on how the Indian Trade Marks Registry performs its statutory duty of searching and citing rival marks. Perhaps the first time in recent memory, the Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks and Registry officials were asked to explain and demonstrate how the Registry identifies deceptively similar marks before accepting or advertising an application.
Question arose on the internal mechanics of the Registry’s search process, forcing senior officers to file affidavits and even conduct live demonstrations of the search used to screen new applications. It underscores that advertising a mark is not a mechanical act, the Registrar must apply his mind under Section 20 of the Trade Marks Act and Rule 33 of the Rules to identify conflicting earlier marks.
The decision affirms that when the Registry fails in this duty, affected proprietors need not wait for the lengthy opposition process; they can approach the High Court under Article 226. This makes the case a precedent on Registry accountability and raises the bar for procedural rigor in trademark examination.
Facts of the case:
Ashiana Ispat filed five applications for the mark “AL KAMDHENU GOLD.” The Trade Marks Registry advertised three applications and issued examination report in two others , but failed to cite several of Kamdhenu’s earlier registered marks.
Kamdhenu filed writ petitions before Delhi High Court, arguing that the Registry’s omissions undermined the integrity of the trademark system. The Single Judge remanded all applications for de novo consideration after the Registry admitted lapses, withdrew one acceptance order, and initiated administrative action against examiners.
Aggrieved, Ashiana preferred appeal ( LPAs before the Division Bench), contending it was not allowed to file a counter-affidavit before its rights were prejudiced.
Main Issues before the division bench:
Maintainability of the writ petitions: Whether writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution were maintainable in light of the alternative statutory remedy of opposition under Section 21 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
Entertainability of the writ petitions: Even if maintainable, should the Single Judge have exercised discretion to entertain them, given that opposition proceedings were available?
Procedural fairness to the appellant (Ashiana): Whether the Single Judge erred in remanding the trademark applications to the Registrar without allowing Ashiana (the applicant of the impugned marks) to file a counter-affidavit and place its version on record.
Scope of the Registry’s duty under Rule 33 and Section 20: Whether the Trade Marks Registry failed in its statutory duty to search and cite earlier marks when issuing FERs or advertising Ashiana’s applications, and whether such lapses justified judicial intervention.
Extent of judicial review at the advertisement/FER stage: To what degree can courts interfere with or supervise the Registry’s internal process of examination, acceptance, and advertisement of trademark applications at a pre-opposition stage?
Division Bench Observations and Ruling:
On Maintainability of the writ petitions, the Bench stressed the settled distinction between maintainability and entertainability. Relying on Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. Excise & Taxation Officer and State of Himachal Pradesh v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement, it held that the existence of an alternative remedy (opposition under Section 21 of the TMA) is not an absolute bar to filing a writ petition. Maintainability relates to jurisdiction; entertainability relates to discretion. The Court ruled in favour of writ petitions in such cases being maintainable in law.
On question whether the Single Judge was justified in exercising writ jurisdiction despite the availability of opposition proceedings, The Court left this question open, because the appellant (Ashiana) was not given a chance to file its counter-affidavit. The Division Bench criticised the Single Judge’s approach, with the reasoning that hearing the appellant’s counsel orally is not a substitute for giving an opportunity to file a counter-affidavit. An affected party has a right to put its case on affidavit before any adverse order is passed. Single Judge’s order of 28 May 2025 was quashed and set aside Ashiana granted time to file a counter-affidavit.
On question of Scope of Registry’s duty under Rule 33 / Section 20, the court held that the Registrar is under a mandatory duty to search for and cite earlier marks that are identical or deceptively similar sicnce advertising a mark is not a mechanical act, it requires application of mind. The Trademark Registry’s affidavit and demonstration showed lapses, and even disciplinary action was taken against examiners. The Bench referred to coordinate bench rulings (Jai Bhagwan Gupta v. Registrar of Trade Marks; Kaira District Coop. Milk Producers Union) emphasising tthat examination report must disclose reasons and cannot omit rival marks.
On another vital question of Extent of judicial review at advertisement/examination stage, the Court held that Judicial review is available where there is procedural dereliction or non-application of mind by the Registry. However, the Division Bench clarified that no final finding was recorded on whether Ashiana’s mark was deceptively similar to Kamdhenu’s, that question is still to be considered.
Key Takeaway:
The decision highlights that the Trade Marks Registry cannot treat acceptance or advertisement of marks as a clerical step. The search process must be transparent, thorough, and defensible in court. For trademark owners, the judgment shows that Registry lapses can be challenged directly under Article 226. For the Registry, it is a reminder that its officers’ actions will not escape judicial scrutiny especially when they involve public-facing functions that determine the fate of brands and market identities.
By compelling the Registry to demonstrate its search methodology and holding it accountable for omissions, the judgment signals a shift towards greater transparency and higher standards in trademark examination. Going forward, both applicants and opponents can expect the courts to insist that the Registry discharge its statutory obligations diligently making this a landmark moment in Indian trademark jurisprudence.
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Can Film Titles Be Copyrighted? Lessons from Lootere Dispute and Protecting Movie Names
Disputes over film and web-series titles are becoming increasingly common in India’s entertainment industry. In Sunil S/o Darshan Saberwal Versus Star India Pvt. Ltd. & Ors, Controversy arose around the title “Lootere”, where the producer of a 1993 Hindi film by the same name sought to restrain Disney+Hotstar and other defendants from streaming a web-series carrying that title.
The Bombay High Court, in its judgment delivered on 18 August 2025 by Justice Sandeep V. Marne, examined whether copyright subsists in a film title, whether registration with film-producers’ associations creates enforceable rights, and whether the plaintiff was entitled to an interim injunction halting the web-series.The Court had to decide whether the plaintiff could claim exclusive rights in the title “Lootere” based on copyright or association registration, and if so, whether interim relief in the form of an injunction against the web-series was justified.
The Case:
The plaintiff, produced the film Lootere in 1993 and later obtained a copyright certificate for the cinematograph film. The title “Lootere” was also registered with various film-producers associations, renewing it to cover feature films, TV serials, web-series, and web films.
In September 2022, the plaintiff discovered the trailer of a web-series titled “Lootere” set to stream on Disney+Hotstar, and issued a legal notice. The defendants responded but continued production. The web-series premiered on 22 March 2024 and has since been available for streaming.The plaintiff approached Bombay High Court seeking injunction against the defendants from producing or streaming the web-series.
Court deliberated on various issues, mainly whether copyright subsist in a mere film title under the Copyright Act, 1957 and do registrations with film-producers’ associations create legally enforceable rights against non-members?
Court’s Observations and Ruling:
No copyright in mere titles: The Court relied on Apex Court’s decision in Krishika Lulla v. Shyam V. Devkatta and reaffirmed that film titles, being ordinary words, do not attract copyright protection unless exceptionally original.
Association registration not enforceable against non-members: Registrations with producers’ associations are contractual arrangements binding only within the associations. They do not create statutory rights against outsiders like the defendants.
Industry practice insufficient: Duplication of titles in the film industry is common, and mere identity of titles does not amount to copyright infringement.
Delay fatal to injunction: The plaintiff waited for very long after first objecting before filing the suit. By the time of hearing, the web-series had already been streaming, making the relief sought impractical.
Prima facie case not established: The plaintiff neither demonstrated exclusive statutory rights in the title nor pleaded passing off or trademark infringement. Without a prima facie case, irreparable injury and balance of convenience did not arise.The Court declined to restrain the defendants, noting that the plaintiff may pursue damages but cannot prevent the continued streaming of the web-series.
The key takeaways from the judgment, can be summarised as , Titles usually lack copyright protection. Indian law does not recognize ordinary film titles as “works” under the Copyright Act and Association registrations are weak shields. While useful as industry notices, such registrations cannot be enforced against non-members in court.
Protection of Movie Titles:
To effectively protect a movie name, producers should move beyond association registrations and rely on statutory mechanisms. The most reliable method is trademark registration of the title under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, particularly when the title is distinctive and intended for use across multiple works or merchandise. In addition, producers should act promptly on discovering potential misuse, since delay can defeat injunction claims. Together, these measures provide a far stronger and enforceable shield for safeguarding film and web-series titles than reliance on copyright law, which generally does not protect titles.
The Lootere case is a reminder that copyright is ill-suited to protect film titles. For the entertainment industry, the judgment signals that association registrations, while valuable internally, carry little weight in court against outsiders. Legal protection of titles must be built on trademarks, goodwill, and timely enforcement.
The decision is a reaffirmation of settled principles, that a party cannot claim any copyright in the title. The works in which copyright subsist has been set out in Section 13(1) of the Copyright Act, 1957 and which consists of the original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic work; cinematographic film; and sound recording. A title of a work cannot be considered to be the subject-matter of copyright law because a title by itself is in the nature of a name of a work and is not complete by itself, without the work.
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Calcutta High Court Reaffirms Strict Approach to Section 3(k) (Google LLC v. Controller of Patents)
The Calcutta High Court in Google LLC v. Controller of Patents (decided on 6 August 2025), has reaffirmed the strict approach to computer-related inventions (CRIs) under Indian patent law.
Google filed Patent Application No. 2705/KOLNP/2014, titled “A Method for Labelling Visited Locations Based on Contact Information”, which sought to patent a method for tagging user, visited locations with contact labels to improve location-aware services. The Indian Patent Office rejected the application on 3 July 2020, invoking Section 3(k) of the Patents Act, 1970, which excludes “a mathematical or business method or a computer programme per se or algorithms” from patent protection. The application was filed in November 2014.
The Controller of Patents concluded that the claims were no more than algorithmic processing performed on a single computing device. Functional steps such as “collecting,” “determining,” “associating,” and “outputting” were considered abstract, result oriented descriptions lacking any novel hardware or measurable technical advancement. Additionally, the application suffered from a procedural defect as the Proof of Right document for one inventor was found defective.
On appeal beforeunder Section 117A of the Patents Act, challenging an order dated 3 July, 2020, passed by the Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs, Google argued that its invention produced a genuine technical effect and offered a technological solution rather than a mere software program. Google relied on precedents such as Ferid Allani v. Union of India (2019), Blackberry Limited v. Controller of Patents (2024), and Microsoft Technology Licensing v. Assistant Controller of Patents (2024), where courts had acknowledged software, related inventions that demonstrated improvement in system performance.
However, the Calcutta High Court was not convinced. Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur observed that the invention merely automated contextual labelling of location data and amounted to an administrative or management function. Since no technical contribution or hardware integration was disclosed, the invention fell within the exclusion under Section 3(k) of the Patents Act.
The Court also clarified the role of the CRI Guidelines issued by the Indian Patent Office. While examiners may refer to them, such as the 2017 Guidelines prescribing the three-step test for CRIs, the Court emphasized that these Guidelines are interpretative aids and not binding law. Statutory provisions and judicial precedents continue to take precedence in determining patentability.
Thus, Section 3(k) continues to present a hurdle, and CRI applications will only succeed if they show a clear technical advancement or improvement beyond generic data processing. Broad, functional claims expressed in abstract language are unlikely to meet this threshold.
Procedural compliance, including accurate Proof of Right filings, is equally critical. Ultimately, the decision underscores that while computer-related inventions in India may gain protection where genuine technical contributions are shown, courts will apply Section 3(k) strictly to prevent patents on software per se.
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Territorial Jurisdiction in Patent Suits – Delhi HC’s Ruling in Kubota vs Godabari
The Delhi High Court in Kubota Corporation vs Godabari Agro Machinery and Services (12 August 2025) dealt with a significant question of territorial jurisdiction in patent infringement suits. The Court was asked to decide whether an “offer for sale” of an allegedly infringing product within Delhi, even without proof of an actual sale, was sufficient to confer jurisdiction. In rejecting the defendant’s objection under Order VII Rule 10 CPC, which governs the return of a plaint when a court finds it lacks the necessary jurisdiction to try the case, the Court reaffirmed that offers for sale of patented products within a forum are enough to establish cause of action, making this judgment a vital precedent for patent holders and businesses facing cross-border infringement disputes in India.
Kubota is a multinational engaged in manufacturing patented agricultural machinery, particularly self-propelled combine harvesters under the brand name HARVES KING. The defendants comprised a Chinese parent company (Defendant No.3), its overseas subsidiary (Defendant No.2), and an Indian company based in Orissa (Defendant No.1), which imported, assembled, and sold the machines in India.
The main questions before the Court were whether Delhi High Court had jurisdiction despite the defendants not being based in Delhi, whether an “offer for sale” was sufficient to establish jurisdiction under Section 48 of the Patents Act. As per Section 48(a) of the Patents Act, 1970, a patentee has the exclusive right to prevent third-parties from selling or offering for sale a patented product in India.
Another question before the Court was whether communications by dealers or distributors could confer jurisdiction, and whether trap transactions carried out by the Plaintiff’s investigators could form the basis for jurisdiction.
The Court observed that at the stage of an application under Order VII Rule 10 CPC, all averments in the plaint must be assumed to be true. It relied on the investigator’s affidavit and email correspondence, which showed that Defendant No.1’s Sales Manager had offered to deliver the impugned product in Delhi. Section 48 of the Patents Act confers exclusive rights on a patentee not only to prevent sales but also offers for sale of a patented product. Hence, even without actual sales in Delhi, the offer for delivery there created a valid cause of action.
The Court distinguished precedents such as Kohinoor Seed and Banyan Tree, noting that those cases dealt with mere online listings or website access, while the present case involved a direct offer for supply in Delhi. It further held that Agroharvest Solutions, being a distributor, did not need to be impleaded separately since the communication had been channelled through Defendant No.1’s Sales Manager.
On this basis, the Court concluded that part of the cause of action had arisen within Delhi under Section 20(c) CPC. The application seeking return of the plaint was dismissed, and the Delhi High Court retained jurisdiction over the suit.
The key takeaway from this ruling is that in patent infringement suits, even an offer for sale of the infringing product within the forum’s jurisdiction is enough to establish territorial jurisdiction, and an actual sale is not necessary. Courts will accept plaint averments as true at the preliminary stage, and communications made by agents or distributors can be sufficient to show territorial links.
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Impact of USPTO’s AAPA Restrictions on Patent Drafting
As per news reports the new USPTO guidance restricts use of Applicant Admitted Prior Art (AAPA) in IPRs. It will no longer qualify as standalone prior art but can be combined with other references.
If you’re in patents, you’ve likely heard of “Applicant Admitted Prior Art (AAPA)”. This refers to statements in a “patent specification”, where the applicant admits something is already “known” or “conventional.” AAPA is considered risky, mainly because, those statements can later be used against the patent, even if no external prior art is cited. This can be explained as, when you write “It is well known that lithium batteries are used in …”, usage of “well known” can give challengers free prior art ammunition.
On August 22, 2025, USPTO issued a new guidance memo that significantly limits the types of prior art that can be used in IPR proceedings before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). Effective September 1, 2025, AAPA and general knowledge can no longer be used to establish claim elements or supply missing limitations, even when combined with other prior art. This policy supersedes previous USPTO guidance and narrows interpretations by the Federal Circuit in Qualcomm Inc. V. Apple Inc.
Earlier the disputes between Qualcomm and Apple led to the court had holding that AAPA could be used as part of an obviousness challenge in IPRs. This alarmed applicants because casual wording in the background section could tank a patent years later. As per the new USPTO guidance (Aug 2025), The Office has now restricted AAPA’s use in IPRs. It clarified that:
AAPA cannot serve as standalone prior art for invalidating claims.
It may only be used to interpret claim scope or in combination with other prior art references.
Patent Drafting Tips:
This is a big relief for applicants, but smart drafting remains the best shield. While drafting patent specification, it is important to:
Avoid saying “well known” or “conventional.”
Cite published patents/literature instead of making admissions.
A disclaimer can be added that the discussion of prior art should not be construed as an admission that it is prior art under applicable law.
Laws…Analysis…Updates…And More
LAW-IP AND MORE 